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Introduction
Despite the lack of academic interest in the work of the 
Executive Committee of the Program of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (EXCOM), there is arguably no 
forum that is more important in terms of international refu-
gee protection than the annual EXCOM sessions. This is the 
public face of diplomatic efforts to promote international 
refugee protection. What goes on behind closed doors in 
EXCOM’s Standing Committee may be more revealing in 
terms of the policy developments envisaged by influential 
states, but it cannot replace public declarations made by 
state representatives at the EXCOM sessions.
While there is a risk that its plenary sessions will be 
bogged down and become overly politicized, EXCOM 
should attract the attention of analysts concerned by refu-
gee problems around the world. Indeed, UNHCR should be 
encouraged to make publicly accessible on its website the 
various state declarations so that we better understand the 
positions defended by our governments on the international 
stage.
The EXCOM session held in October 2009 was the 60th 
session held since the body was created fifty years earlier. 
The discussions in this important forum have evolved over 
the decades as new expressions have emerged that reflect 
Western intellectual trends: “human security,” “delivering 
protection,” “humanitarian space” (to be distinguished 
from “protection space”), etc. Yet refugee protection prob-
lems remain fundamentally similar to those preoccupy-
ing the governments that first created the post of High 
Commissioner for Refugees in 1921. For the most part, 
the formal questions associated with the origins of inter-
national refugee protection remain valid almost nine dec-
ades after they were being formulated in the early phases 
of the multilateral system created after the First World War. 
What obligations will states accept towards fleeing foreign-
ers designated as “refugees”? What forms of international 
solidarity will states accept in order to help other states dir-
ectly affected by refugee flows?
As UNHCR’s governing body, EXCOM has to deal with 
the same difficult problem of fleeing refugees in a world of 
sovereign states that jealously guard their territorial sover-
eignty. Yet it also has to deal with the growing number of 
influential non-state actors in a new context in which it is no 
longer controversial to suggest that state sovereignty is not 
absolute. International refugee law, along with human rights 
law, has developed considerably since the first attempts to 
create international institutional structures during the first 
half of the twentieth century.
EXCOM and Its Structural Ambiguities
It is worth emphasizing that UNHCR, as a subsidiary 
organ of the UN General Assembly, is supposed to collab-
orate with governments which represent states. The first 
paragraph of UNHCR’s 1950 Statute specifies that it “shall 
assume the function of providing international protection 
[for refugees] … and of seeking permanent solutions … by 
assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the 
Governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate 
the voluntary repatriation … or their assimilation” (empha-
sis added).
The difficulties of international protection are illustrated 
by the fact that UNHCR is supposed to protect refugees in 
collaboration with UN members which are often reluctant 
host states. The requirement to co-operate with govern-
ments is also found explicitly and implicitly throughout 
paragraph 8 of the Statute that outlines the activities of 
UNHCR. This fundamental aspect of its mandate follows 
the traditional role of the High Commissioner as articu-
lated in the 1920s.1 There is a tension between two poten-
tially contradictory functions: applying pressure on states 
to protect refugees and collaborating with governments. 
There are clearly limits to the pressure UNHCR can apply 
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without indisposing the states that created it and thereby 
jeopardizing its future.2 Watchdog-type roles or activities 
advocated by some (particularly Western) jurists who place 
their trust in mechanisms “untainted by the political con-
trol of states”3 run counter to the logic of a system set up 
by states.
With its connection to a ninety-year institutional history, 
UNHCR has nevertheless acquired considerable author-
ity in international law and should not be criticized lightly. 
However, it may be worth pointing out some basic confusion 
or misunderstanding about general aspects of the mandate.
During the last few years, some comments by UNHCR’s 
most senior lawyers may be interpreted as suggesting 
UNHCR is an independent agency. The Director of 
International Protection has noted that “[t]here is the 
perennial issue in some quarters of a perceived lack of 
independence because UNHCR’s budget hinges largely 
on the voluntary contributions of donor countries.”4 
Similarly, the Assistant High Commissioner (Protection) 
has described UNHCR as “a humanitarian agency which 
operates independently of any political agenda … [working] 
in accordance with basic principles of humanitarian action—
notably impartiality and independence.”5
Whereas the above statements are not unequivocal, the 
European Court of Human Rights has clearly described 
UNHCR as a body “whose independence, reliability and 
objectivity are, in [the court’s] view, beyond doubt.”6 Yet 
nothing in the Statute suggests UNHCR was intended to 
operate as an independent agency. On the contrary, the ref-
erence to independence that was mentioned in the initial 
1949 resolution calling for the creation of UNHCR was not 
included later in the subsequent 1950 resolution and Statute 
that actually created the agency.7 Again, this echoes a basic 
issue that was considered carefully by the members of the 
League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s.8
Even if we acknowledge that UNHCR is formally 
“dependent,” decades of practice may have reinforced a de 
facto autonomy in the sense that credibility on protection 
requires that UNHCR not be perceived as a simple tool to 
be manipulated by states. Although it is relatively clear that 
many within UNHCR believe the agency’s authority would 
suffer if it were to be perceived as lacking in independ-
ence, some of its actions, such as its long-standing efforts 
to initiate the process for the adoption of EXCOM conclu-
sions, suggest that it has in fact exercised a certain amount 
of autonomy over the years.
It is also worth remembering that EXCOM was origin-
ally intended to advise the High Commissioner, not states.9 
While it is not clear that the mandate was to advise on pro-
tection (i.e. sensitive) matters, in practice EXCOM began 
addressing protection approximately three years after its 
creation.10 A decade later it was directly advising states on 
protection problems.11
These developments occurred with the encouragement 
of the predecessors to the currently named Division of 
International Protection (DIP) which drafted and pushed 
for progressive conclusions on protection.12 This situation 
eventually resulted in an ever-increasing number of EXCOM 
conclusions that were largely intended to defend previously 
adopted norms, rather than to respond to requests for guid-
ance from the High Commissioner or states.
While it is understandable that an international cadre of 
UN specialists has developed unparalleled expertise in refu-
gee protection, there are risks in having UNHCR assume 
the responsibilities that were reserved for states.13 Perhaps 
the most striking example of the problems that arise from 
this institutional phenomenon is the aborted conference 
in early 1977 that convened under UNHCR’s leadership in 
order to adopt a treaty on asylum. Indeed, a DIP-centred 
policy-making process runs the risk of complete failure in 
an international system that is ultimately based on volun-
tary state involvement.14
We may ask ourselves whether EXCOM has acted ultra 
vires or whether these important aspects of its practical evo-
lution have been validated by the de facto acquiescence of 
member states. It could be argued that the legal maxim boni 
judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem justifies an enlargement 
of competence within tolerable limits.15 The point being 
raised here is that an EXCOM under too much influence 
from UNHCR’s protection specialists finds itself possibly 
exceeding the threshold limit. Contrary to the advice of 
some observers, it is unlikely that the solution to this com-
plicated problem will be to recognize a de facto practice by 
providing EXCOM with a formal mandate to advise states 
on protection.16
As a governing body of UNHCR, EXCOM has to deal 
with various internal divisions from the perspective of 
states. Recent EXCOM sessions reveal that various partici-
pants have diverging views on such contentious issues as the 
institution’s rapid expansion, the potential tension between 
protection and assistance, an asylum-centred focus as 
opposed to a comprehensive strategy, an activist as opposed 
to a conservative state-focused approach, etc.
Context of 60th Session and Governmental 
Delegations
There are various ways to interpret the appropriate role 
for UNHCR and its EXCOM, just as there are different 
approaches to ensure effective refugee protection. The pes-
simistic tone of recent Notes on International Protection 
prepared for EXCOM by UNHCR’s Division of International 
Protection, as well as the harsh assessment of NGOs at 
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the 60th session, suggests that new thinking is needed to 
improve the situation of the world’s refugees.
The increasingly interdisciplinary nature of forced 
migration studies has resulted in many new analytical 
insights that would have been difficult to imagine in the 
past. However, interdisciplinary research also carries some 
risks, and unfortunately a certain amount of confusion has 
been created in relation to the normative framework. One 
of the results is that many non-legal analysts do not seem 
to understand fully that treaties (sometimes called “conven-
tions,” “protocols,” etc.) are adopted voluntarily by states 
and cannot be imposed by other international actors (e.g. 
international organizations, NGOs).
To the extent that understandings of our modern inter-
national system are still based on a positivist perspective 
that clearly distinguishes between legal rules and moral or 
political duties, it is important to appreciate that states have 
to willingly give up their sovereignty on issues that are to 
be regulated by treaties. In this context, it should be under-
lined that it was difficult enough to get states to accept non-
refoulement in a treaty signed in 1951 (with ambiguities still 
remaining as to its interpretation), while the idea of a legally 
binding right to asylum did not materialize in 1951 and was 
also rejected at the international conference on the subject 
held in 1977.
Yet confusion relating to normative relativity is not 
solely the result of terminological or conceptual gaps 
between academic disciplines. This becomes apparent when 
UNHCR documents mention vaguely a “right to asylum” 
or when senior UNHCR legal specialists suggest there is a 
“collective duty” to help struggling host states in terms of 
burden-sharing. While most lawyers will be aware (and will 
acknowledge) that the terms “right” or “duty” are used here 
in a non-legal manner, social scientists and other non-legal 
analysts may be left with the impression that we are dealing 
with binding legal norms. This kind of misleading use of 
terms is common in forced migration studies, and it points 
to questionable interdisciplinary practices.
Although it goes against the flow of conventional think-
ing in the field, it may sometimes be more effective to be 
blunt and upfront in our descriptive analysis and assess-
ment of the status quo when we want to encourage reform. 
For example, there is no legal obligation to share the refu-
gee burden in any of the treaties that make up international 
refugee law. If we want reform, let us acknowledge this 
unfortunate situation, and try to build realistically rather 
than bluff our way forward by pressuring certain vulnerable 
states to accept refugees in the name of solidarity.
Before suggesting there is a conflict between principles 
and practical realities,17 it is prudent to make sure an 
accurate picture of state obligations is presented, including 
acknowledgement of problems related to normative relativ-
ity and/or disputes over interpretation of norms. If refugee 
advocates invoke legal authority to uphold refugee protec-
tion principles, then they should strive to present interpreta-
tions of international law that are likely to achieve consen-
sus. Otherwise, so-called principled approaches will risk 
being dismissed and the strategy will backfire. The resulting 
potential for marginalization of the law will not further the 
cause of refugee protection in the long run.
It follows from the above comments that a realistic and 
reform-minded EXCOM should be the forum for genuine 
discussions that take into account state commitments and 
objections in an honest and upfront manner.
Indeed, underestimating the importance of state sover-
eignty has arguably led to several High Commissioners 
overshooting on prominent issues in recent decades: the 
mistaken supposition that the so-called “Convention Plus 
initiative” launched in 2002 could lead to a new comple-
mentary treaty on burden-sharing,18 as well as the ill-pre-
pared push in 1977 for a treaty that would establish a right 
to asylum.19 Neither of these prominent initiatives succeeded, 
and some observers consider them as significant diplomatic 
defeats.
The state delegations that arrive at Geneva for the EXCOM 
sessions in order to present national views and to negotiate 
common positions can be complex in the sense that they 
are often composed of representatives from different min-
istries and departments that may have divergent interests.20 
As such, a state’s consensus declaration can carry consider-
able weight as a compromise position between its different 
governmental actors.
Whereas these kinds of internal dynamics can be reveal-
ing in terms of the different facets of refugee protection, 
there is another more tedious dimension to EXCOM ses-
sions that warrants being highlighted because it reflects 
an important reason why states participate in the collect-
ive enterprise known as international refugee protection. 
Delegations at EXCOM often present from a public relations 
perspective the positive achievements of their states, while 
doing their best to appear concerned about refugee prob-
lems around the world. Self-promotion, whether by states 
or organizations, is a key part of the international refu-
gee regime. Indeed, it should not be surprising that states 
often have an interest in appearing humanitarian while not 
necessarily committing themselves to significant obliga-
tions. Many even present their generosity toward refugees 
as a defining part of their identity or tradition, regardless 
of the accuracy of such a representation. This is an under-
studied, yet fundamental, dimension of the politics of refu-
gee protection. From a cynical perspective, this could mean 
that an effective delegation is one that is vocal about faraway 
 Observations on EXCOM’s 60th Session (2009) 
135
problems while making sure that its own record will not be 
further scrutinized.
The preceding criticism points to the hypocrisy that 
sometimes characterizes certain aspects of refugee protec-
tion. For example, some EXCOM members may want to 
adopt international norms or put pressure on other states, 
while they remain unwilling to discuss their own records. 
Some members will ask UNHCR to be accountable on a var-
iety of issues such as children or gender, yet they are them-
selves reluctant to be held accountable to UNHCR.
Much like the dynamic within the former UN Human 
Rights Commission and the evolving tone of debates within 
the UN Human Rights Council, the risk of creating a pol-
iticized EXCOM is clearly present. Although there are now 
many new EXCOM members, it is safe to claim that a con-
siderable number of delegations are not particularly active 
and are represented by lower-level diplomats. Other states, 
on the other hand, are becoming increasingly bolder and 
have even begun using the forum to block various collective 
initiatives. If truth be told, the tendency is such that some 
states may be suspected of deliberately trying to subvert or 
sabotage initiatives led by their adversaries. For example, if 
certain Middle Eastern states do not want birthright regis-
tration for handicapped refugees, as members of EXCOM 
they are legally entitled to advise the High Commissioner 
on the issue. UNHCR is left with little choice than to retract 
such seemingly useful initiatives.
Particular Nature of EXCOM Conclusions
Several observations follow from the state-centred analysis 
presented in the preceding sections.
In terms of international refugee policy, one concrete 
outcome of EXCOM sessions is the adoption of so-called 
conclusions. As EXCOM is not formally mandated to cre-
ate binding legal rules, the conclusions can be considered 
a form of soft law. Although the concept of soft law is con-
troversial in general international law circles that consider a 
norm to be either law or non-law,21 human rights advocates 
tend to use it as an important aspect of the overall norma-
tive framework.22 Many refugee specialists have already 
highlighted the contribution of EXCOM conclusions in the 
progressive development of soft law.23
When these non-legal norms are not respected and 
EXCOM wants to address the problems of implementation, 
the general approach of member states has been to reaffirm 
the norms previously endorsed. In particular cases involv-
ing important principles, EXCOM may seek endorsement 
by the UN General Assembly. The intention and hope is that 
such a procedure will improve the strength of the conclu-
sions and persuade states to respect them.24 As we are not 
dealing with legal norms, there is no formal judicial method 
to sanction offending states without referring to other bind-
ing sources of law.
However, there is a critical way of examining the prob-
lem of weak implementation that focuses on lessons learned 
from a state-centred analysis. While international norm set-
ting is important, it needs to be conducted with caution and 
prudence because of the voluntary nature of international 
legal rules that relate to sensitive issues of territorial sover-
eignty. This critical perspective (at least in relation to ortho-
dox thinking in forced migration studies) suggests that the 
problems of relativity and double standards have not been 
sufficiently explored.
Conclusions may contribute to the unhelpful relativity 
of norms, a problem underappreciated by the many inter-
disciplinary academics who routinely refer to protection 
principles without adequate explanation of their nature.25 
Rather than assuring improved protection, we need to be 
aware that these discussions carry the risk of reducing the 
authority of the actual legal obligations imposed on states. 
To lump a “right to asylum” or “first asylum” principle along 
with the legally binding prohibition on refoulement can be 
misleading for those inclined to advocate on behalf of refu-
gees (e.g. encouraging them to exaggerate norms or expect 
compliance when there is no actual obligation), and as a 
consequence the approach can suggest to reluctant states 
that the norms may be generally dismissed as an amalgama-
tion of soft law rules. In other words, such an approach runs 
the risk of blurring the distinction between binding and 
non-binding norms.
Let us take the recent Canadian debate on boat people 
(following the arrival of Tamil asylum seekers on the West 
Coast) as an example of a potential problem with the con-
clusion process.
Anyone reading the EXCOM conclusions relevant to 
the situation of boat people will find out that, according 
to EXCOM, a potential host state is supposed to accept the 
asylum seekers on its territory, in an unconditional manner, 
and regardless of whether they arrive in such large numbers 
that they may represent a potential security threat. Host 
states are allowed afterwards to find alternative solutions, 
but this first step has to be respected in all circumstances 
according to the EXCOM conclusions that apply to the situ-
ation of boat people.
The US and Australia (along with Canada) participated 
in the consensus decision to adopt the various conclusions 
that (combined) give us the position outlined above.26 These 
standards were adopted largely in relation to problems con-
fronting coastal states in Asia during the 1970s and 1980s. 
We also need to keep in mind that American and Australian 
courts have in recent years applied different standards (i.e. 
the actual legal norms) in authorizing their states to treat 
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boat people in a different manner (i.e. intercepting and 
sending them elsewhere).27 If someone disagrees with the 
interpretation offered in this section, then it is important 
to consider that our international system is set up to allow 
each contracting state to determine the appropriate inter-
pretation of legal obligations by which it is bound.28 Unlike 
other areas of international human rights law, there is no 
oversight body because states do not want one. In other 
words, the US Supreme Court’s decision allowing the inter-
ception and return of Haitian boat people is the final word, 
at least insofar as international legal obligations are applied 
in the US.
So why would these influential states adopt soft law 
norms that directly oppose the actual hard law which their 
courts apply in practice? As many human rights–related 
approaches to soft law imply, is it because they want to 
eventually build up international practice so that the higher 
norms will actually become the legally binding standards? 
If so, do we seriously think the US will accept a threaten-
ing large-scale movement of boat people onto its shores? Or 
could it be that these conclusions can be used in a different 
way, as part of political or diplomatic efforts to persuade less 
influential states to provide protection in the more remote 
regions of Africa or Asia? There is an automatic assump-
tion in human rights circles that higher norms are neces-
sarily intended to force us to increase our protection efforts 
in an egalitarian manner. The idea that we may be delib-
erately setting double standards seems to escape advocates 
in the field of forced migration studies. If UNHCR were to 
have insisted on the EXCOM-established protection policy 
described above during the recent debate on Tamil boat 
people arriving in Canada, it would have been ridiculed 
and marginalized by most mainstream commentators in 
the country’s media.
This brings us to the recent problem at the 60th session, 
held in 2009, the first year that a protection conclusion was 
not adopted at the end of the regular session since these 
instruments have been published.
Historic Failure to Adopt a Conclusion
For the last few years, the topic of protracted refugee situa-
tions (PRS) has become the focus of considerable efforts 
by UNHCR and its EXCOM. As hinted by the above com-
ments, there is a way of addressing the problem of PRS in a 
less upbeat way than has been presented by analysts work-
ing alongside the Canadian government in order to ensure 
PRS is on the international agenda.29
A considerable amount of political effort was invested 
in the PRS campaign, including a two-day “protection dia-
logue” organized by the High Commissioner in December 
2008. It is noteworthy that a rich member state such as 
Canada, which is not directly confronted with the PRS 
problem (and which receives only a tiny fraction of the 
world’s many refugees), would play a leadership role on this 
problem with the intention of guiding EXCOM towards the 
adoption of a conclusion detailing the applicable norms.
A critical interpretation of what has been achieved in 
terms of PRS at EXCOM might suggest that the topic con-
tributed in blocking the conclusion process and in aggravat-
ing the growing tensions between delegations already div-
ided along North-South lines. After all, the 60th session was 
the first time that no protection conclusions were adopted 
during a regular annual session.30 Was the “compromise” 
text finally adopted in an extraordinary session held two 
months later worth it?31 Was it really a step forward when 
considered along with the problems it created?
From the perspective of poorer refugee-hosting states, it is 
possible that their representatives are fed up with rich north-
ern states pontificating about the importance of protection 
… while avoiding contact with refugees thanks to their geo-
graphic position and their interdiction policies. It is difficult 
to ignore that Canada was pushing for norms to be adopted 
by EXCOM, while many poorer refugee-hosting states were 
sceptical for a variety of reasons. If Canada wanted to show 
credibility on this issue which directly affects other states, 
genuine leadership would suggest that it should have com-
mitted itself by providing the poorer host states with financial 
help.32 In other words, a commitment to share the burden 
(and not simply provide discretionary aid) is arguably the 
only credible involvement on this issue.
Promises of (limited and discretionary) so-called “stra-
tegic” resettlement are not enough, particularly when it is 
relatively clear that it forms part of larger Western attempts 
to persuade the poorer southern states to ultimately accept 
local integration as the actual durable solution for ware-
housed refugees. For the optimists inclined to believe that 
massive repatriation will resolve PRS, the historical record 
suggests we should be a little more pessimistic. Indeed, as 
relatively few refugees in protracted situations will be reset-
tled and as it is unlikely that many countries of origin will 
become safe for return, it would not be surprising if poorer 
states realize that behind the rhetoric may lie an attempt to 
prepare the terrain for the actual solution favoured by rich 
states: local integration in the faraway poor countries.33
Therefore poorer refugee-hosting states have reasons to 
oppose seemingly well-intentioned humanitarian initiatives 
from rich states like Canada. It is not astonishing that a state 
which has hosted many refugees for prolonged periods such 
as Iran, which also receives limited international aid and 
which has difficult diplomatic relations with Canada, would 
not co-operate in EXCOM deliberations on PRS partly led 
by the Canadian delegation. Indeed, the suggestion by the 
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Canadian delegation that “[m]illions of refugees are count-
ing on us to secure a positive outcome”34 in terms of adopt-
ing a conclusion on PRS is not only an exaggeration of the 
effects of these soft law instruments, it may also appear as 
unsophisticated diplomatic pressuring to some observers.
A critical approach to forced migration studies does 
not simply limit itself to advocating for higher protection 
norms and blaming governments for not implementing 
these norms. The public relations dimension of humani-
tarian action should suggest that some initiatives may 
actually conceal other concerns that are not about equitable 
burden-sharing.
If we really want to advance North-South co-operation 
and introduce some equity in the global distribution of 
refugees (and the accompanying burdens on host states), 
then it is more useful to tackle the burden-sharing problem 
in a direct manner. However, past experiences in EXCOM 
suggest that the enthusiasm of rich states disappears when 
the discussion turns to burden-sharing which entails the 
possibility of assuming actual obligations despite geograph-
ical distance.
A blunt and upfront analysis has its benefits, at least in 
terms of thinking about constructive efforts that allow us 
to focus on genuine solutions. After all, solutions are going 
to be institutional. Unless one believes that the refugee 
specialists can do everything, it makes little sense to have 
UNHCR also focus on lots of different activities which do 
not relate directly to asylum (e.g. resolving the problems 
that make people flee in the first place).35 In this sense, it is 
not clear that the concern about PRS advocacy is fundamen-
tally different from the old “root causes” concern of a couple 
of decades ago.36 There is a danger that the refugee special-
ists are being sidetracked from core issues and led towards 
optimistic promises about peace building and post-conflict 
reconstruction:
[T]he Convention Plus initiative lost itself in highly specific issues, 
most likely on account of the Agenda for Protection, with its 
emphasis on the need to solve protracted refugee situations, with-
out explanation as to how those specifics would contribute to an 
effective system of global burden-sharing (the focus on specific 
refugee situations could not be expected to yield the requisite fun-
damental analysis or substitute for such analysis either).37
If UNHCR were doing really well in relation to its core 
responsibilities, the interest in such expansion could be 
understandable. But that is not the dynamic at work here.38 
In the meantime, UNHCR is arguably somewhat absent in 
terms of contributing to the boat people issue, the one prob-
lem that was directly affecting Canada during the period 
preceding and following the 60th session, not to mention 
an issue that affects Australia and the influential EU states 
from the Mediterranean region.
The above analysis may explain some of the new tensions 
and dynamics within EXCOM. Is there a crisis in norm 
making? Perhaps. Yet the problem is not necessarily the 
one being highlighted by many advocates. In any case, it is 
revealing that UNHCR is increasingly being excluded from 
the state-led negotiations relating to the EXCOM session.
The above comments on PRS are related to previous con-
cerns raised about mandates. As non-Western voices gain 
prominence in EXCOM, UNHCR will have more difficulty 
in defending itself against a basic critique of the recent evo-
lution of the refugee protection system:
What we are seeing today is the revival of the liberal cultural-
political ideas of progress and reform that informed the colonial 
project … Political humanitarianism has refused to be limited by 
the classic concept of humanitarianism with its emphasis on the 
principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. In the 
post-cold-war era international humanitarian agencies, both gov-
ernmental and non-governmental, have come to accept the view 
that it is their task to address both the causes and the aftermath of 
a humanitarian crisis … One result is that humanitarian agencies 
have begun to neglect local voices as these often conflict with the 
agenda of states that fund them … Much of the changed approach 
can be traced to the desire of humanitarian agencies to be active 
participants in transforming the non-western world in ways that 
realize the Western vision of good governance.39
Conclusion
While there may be several explanations for the failure to 
adopt a protection conclusion during the regular 60th ses-
sion, this commentary urges analysts to focus on the lessons 
that may be learned from a legal positivist reading of inter-
national obligations and mandates.
Many analysts have already noted that UNHCR’s man-
date sometimes appears to be losing clarity, yet one basic 
aspect on which we need to agree is that this historic institu-
tion was never intended to be (and cannot be expected to act 
as) a strong advocacy watchdog-type body. There are clearly 
limits to how much states will allow themselves to be led by 
the legal services of a multilateral institution (i.e. UNHCR’s 
Division of International Protection) in the implementation 
of important norms concerning refugees that seek access to 
their territories.
These comments point to the observation that there are 
diverging views on the relative independence of UNHCR 
and how this affects EXCOM. There are similar divergences 
on the future of the EXCOM conclusion process. Should the 
focus now be to fix the process or to drop it while pushing 
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elsewhere for the development of norms? The wider UN sys-
tem, for example, allows for possibilities to advance various 
(soft law) norms in other settings such as in the human rights 
committees. These choices reflect underlying tensions within 
EXCOM that relate to different protection approaches which 
can be roughly categorized by their emphasis on consensus-
building or on progressive advocacy.
As a body created by UN member states and supported 
by different governments with varying political/cultural 
traditions (including non-liberal ones), UNHCR’s man-
date should be interpreted with moderation and a reason-
able (yet critical) respect for state sovereignty. One of the 
consequences of an increasingly democratic forum such as 
EXCOM is that a variety of perspectives and issues will be 
raised by member states. This is a fact of life in international 
organizations that want to truly represent their diverse con-
stituents and we have to live with the limitations of action 
which may result. While donor funding trends do not indi-
cate for the moment any major changes, EXCOM may be 
shifting slightly away from the Western-controlled forum 
that has existed since the 1950s. If we believe in the sover-
eign equality of states, and lack a viable alternative that can 
address inequality,40 this development should not necessar-
ily be seen in a negative light by those who oppose a hegem-
onic liberal project that seeks to reshape international policy 
making on forced migration issues.
Likewise, if we accept that primary responsibility for 
refugee protection lies with states, then the flip side of this 
proposition is that states have a key role in determining 
the norms. If they prefer to politicize protection debates in 
EXCOM and not to recommend effective approaches, then 
there is no magic way of bypassing this impasse. When we 
consider the risks of politicization, we should also appreci-
ate that it can take many forms. For behind the more direct 
forms that involve open accusations, there have always been 
the more subtle forms that involve scoring public relations 
points and maintaining a humanitarian façade. Genuine 
leadership will move beyond these diversions and recognize 
the human plight that demands we assume responsibility 
for our collective worldwide protection failures.
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